Police System In India - Bitter Truth by Prashant Manchanda

PRASHANT MANCHANDA

The Author is a renowned Public Spirited Lawyer practising in the Hon'ble Supreme Court & Delhi High Court who specialises in bringing major reforms in the legal, political as well as administrative functioning of the country along with promoting Citizen Awareness on all three above mentioned levels.

Article:

Do you remember the famous dialoguefrom the film SHOLAY “Hum angrezon kezamane ke jailor hain”.  It still makes us laugh till our stomachs hurt! But,have you ever sat back and thought whether this sentence could actually have a meaning and is not just a hilarious filmy line or a concoction of a dreamy film writer? That it could be a deep rooted truth that affects our day-to-day life? If not, then please do think again because there can never be smoke without fire and thisdialogue and character definitely warrants public awareness and pondering. 

This article will give you a glimpse, in fact an initiation, on how to view this intelligently humorous  one-liner in a much different light and a significant way.

So let's begin.

The erstwhile Police Force of the British Raj were trained to administer terror over our people for the perpetuation of foreign domination and it still heavily inspires our current Police administration who feel  it to be their duty to treat a layman or a common citizen unfairly with no remorse.The proper way for the police of a free country to conduct themselves was well expressed in a circular which the then former Commissioner of Police, Kolkata, Mr.H.S.Ghose Chaudhuri had occasion to issue to the police. In it he stated: "I could understand that, for in those days they lived in a different regime. But I wonder why there should be complaints now. It is to serve the people that the police exist. It is to protect their lives and property that the police live and labor for. The public come to the police only when in trouble. They come aggrieved for guidance and help. If at that time policeman shows discourtesy he violates the policeman’s code of honor, commits a crime against the state and the people and sin against God. He then needs just punishment".

We need to understand that the idea of having a welfare state envisaged by our Constitutional experts in the Constitution of India stands completely null and void in absence of a proper Criminal Justice system. And in our country, the Police machinery plays one of the most important roles in setting the criminal law into motion by lodging FIR’s and conducting unbiased and speedy investigation. Moreover, in order to accomplish the solemn purpose of having a crime free society the more onerous duty is cast on the Police and Learned Magistrates. There is a well demarcated sphere of activity between the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government as Police, Prisons, Courts are all State subjects under Schedule Seven of the Indian Constitution. 

The executive who is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime, and if an offence is alleged to have been committed then it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offenders to book. Needless  to state the ill consequences which can follow if the police refuses to investigate a cognizable(offences in which the police is duty bound to lodge an FIR, without acquiring prior permission of a magistrate in order to  investigate the case, together with the power to arrest  without warrant) offence such as theft, murder, dacoity, rape, hurt, assault, robbery, trespass, cheating etc). As per the scheme and policy of the criminal procedure code - No investigation in an offence can be  commenced without registration of FIR’s -offence being reduced in writing and  entered in a book maintained by the Police stations- placed under section 154 of the code, because the mandate of collecting evidence, recording statements of witnesses(161Cr.P.C) and the likewise are provided only  in the following sections 156-174 of the Cr.P.C (stage that comes only after registration of FIR).

Hon’ble Supreme Court realizing the importance of  the police department in maintaining  law and order in the state, issued strict guidelines to them  in the case of State of Haryana V. Ch. BhajanLal  1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 .However, it is most unfortunate that Delhi Police is blatantly defying the law laid down by the Hon’ble supreme court on registration of cases on information disclosing commission of cognizable offence which gradually jeopardises the criminal justice system here with absolutely no vision for the statutory law or commitment to ideals. Investigating officers due to the patronage of senior officers are rather encouraged to implement non-registration of FIRs(First Information Report) with impunity.

The growing menace of non-registration of FIRs in violation of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a serious turn and is clearly evident in thestartling and shocking sample data of Police Station/Sub -Division Kotwali,which was provided to me by a public spirited inspector of Delhi Police. I have chosen this data as he was posted in Delhi in the year 1978 and occasionally worked as Duty Officer to perform the duty of registration of cases. The total cases registered in police station Kotwaliin the year 1978 were 2066 against 560 in the same police station in the year 2005, a whopping decline of more than 368 percent. This drastic decline has been reported irrespective of manifold increase in local population and un-imaginable influx of daily visitors as well as immigrants in this commercial area.  This decline is more deplorable in the context that 1978 was also not free fromburking of crime. The Officers at the level of Police Stations Incharge were subjected to action for their failure to control crime and they also resorted toburking crime which has virtuallyjeopardised  the criminal-justice system.

The figures shown below duly reflect it :-

Nature of crime		1978	2005
Attempt to Murder		16	NIL
Robbery		32	4
Riots		8	NIL
Misc.Theft		523	27
Pick-Pocketing		246	24
Cycle Theft		179	NIL
Motor Vehicle Theft		115	16
Burglary		51	8
Cheating/Criminal Breach of breach of Trust		99	9
Hurt	51		5
Snatching	11		NIL

Relevant here to quote the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme court vis-à-vis duties of Police officers: “At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer can not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register  a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code. "

The grotesque and strangely distortedfigures of remaining police stations of Delhi in competition with each other with regards to showing reduction of crime  in their area and working under the same set-up also present maliciously doctored data on crime. Apparently, the crime figures completely disregard the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on mandatory registration of cases. The crime data of year 2005 compared to year 1978 is ridiculous as it defeats the very purpose of compiling it by spendingcrores of rupees from public exchequer. This manufactured data creation puts the police officers on wrong path instead of instead of helping crime control, prevention and detection of crime. The burking of crime continues all over Delhi. It is disgusting that murder cases are also given shape of suicides and accidents. Particularly, unclaimed dead bodies found in rivers, nullahs and roadsides containing evidence of murder go un-registered and of course hobnobbing with Autopsy Surgeons proves useful. In these matters instead of going all out to identify dead bodies malicious efforts on the contrary are made as identification of dead body would bring forth compulsion of registration of the case. Similarly, cases of attempt to murder are not registered even when the 'M.L.C.' of Medical Officers clearly provides evidence of serious injuries on vital parts of victims. Records of M.L.Cs would duly substantiate the above facts.

Shockingly, under the present set up, a situation has been created where instead of devising methods and reforms on seeking information on crime, the police refuses to entertain information because of motive of non-registration of case. This leads to destruction of evidence and continuation of crime. It in itself provides freedom to criminals to continue their nefarious designs. The members of public are fully aware of callousness on the part of police on registration of cases and have lost their faith in them. They are almost not reporting their pecuniary loss in pick pocketing, thefts, burglaries of evensizeable cash, goods and so on.  However, in matters of offence involving motor vehicle and mobile phone they have no option but to inform the police because of fear of misuse of vehicle/mobile by criminals putting onus on them. 

Shamefully, the highest placed Police Officer too considers it a moment to rejoice as figures dip.  We have to understand & realise that non-registration of cases is demolishing the very base of criminal- justice system. Citizens hope against hope that perhaps their case may be handled by some sensitive police officer resulting in prompt registration of case for follow-up action. The reporting is also necessary for claiming insurance in matter of vehicles/mobile phone under insurance coverage. They are in for rude shock. They are barefoot of information that the police hate prompt registration of a case, if the complainant is not influential, rich and powerful. 

The motor vehicle/mobile phone theft, poses threat of misuse of vehicle by terrorist outfits and hardcore criminals to facilitate crimes of terror against the State, mass killings, dacoity, robbery, rape and so on. However, because of non-registration of case promptly, entire network of police has become redundant. The staff manning Police control room, District Control Rooms, Wireless infrastructure at police stations, barricading, road checking, mobile checking, patrolling and so on created for intercepting the vehicle involved in crime and criminals has no job to do in the absence of prompt furnishing of details of crime to them. The root cause remains intentional and deliberate non-registration of crime. It defeats the purpose for whichCrores of rupees have been invested from public exchequer.

The hope of getting back vehicles as abandoned/unclaimed in any part of Delhi prompts the police to 'wait' before a case is registered. In the matter of vehicle found abandoned after commission of crime, having insurance coverage of otherwise, loss of important parts of vehicle as also petrol stolen is not considered 'theft' qualifying for registration of case.  The scientific methods of connecting criminals with crime are also not opted in the matters of recovery of abandoned vehicle. Obviously, it has no meaning when case is not registered. The benefit - Crime graph remains very low. The criminals naturally feel obliged. This 'wait' for registration of cases with regard to stolen vehicle not found abandoned can extend from 5-6 days to indefinite period. The public having valid insurance on vehicles undergoes unrelenting trauma of running from post to pillar for getting registration of cases, a prerequisite to get the claim. They succeed in their effort if they don't stop pursuing registration of case, but only after police is sure that the criminals have not abandoned the vehicle.  However, the people without insurance, loose their patience early as Insurance amount is not in sight.  In most of such cases the information of theft is not considered for registration of cases.  Insurance providers on stolen cars mobile phones are smiling. 

The registration of theft of mobile phone irrespective of insurance coverage or otherwise is an uphill task. Police does not register cases of mobile theft except in exceptional cases. The public has option to lodge a report of 'missing' or 'loss' of phone not requiring registration of case.  Records will show that more than 90 percent missing or loss of mobile phone reports relate to theft, snatching, robbery and so on because of directions on non-registration of cases. Now, any one can engage in self-employment in the trade of pick-pocketing, snatching and so on as in the absence of registration of case , there can not be any effort to trace him and he can constantly earn in his chosen illegal trade almost unchecked. Perhaps, Delhi Police feels that it is necessary due to the social angle to favour economically weak criminals to ensure their livelihood in the face of unemployment.

The record of wireless messages in the shape of 'Log Books' relating to information made by public to Police Control Room and action taken by local police will clearly show minimising andburking of crime in its true nature. The records of PCR, District Control Rooms and Police Stations will on the same crime provide different versions. In most of the cases the Police Control Room confirms commission of cognizable offence but local police does not act in compliance of law to register a case. The record of Police Control will also show the complicity of senior police officers in the said matter. The Command Room of Police Control Room has officers of the stature of Assistant Commissioner of Police deployed in shifts mainly to apprise the Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Joint Commissioner of Police of concerned Ranges on ground reality of heinous crimes. However, on the spot reports made by officers of local police in these cases are totally different aimed atburking of crime and still deliberately ignored by the Senior Officers. These reports form the basis of follow-up action for non-registration of cases on information disclosing cognizable offence. A study of above record will provide very interesting explanations, twisted facts clearly establishing that process of burking/ minimising of crime is being effectively undertaken by officers of concerned police stations. 

The senior police officers besides briefings of Police Control Room also have wireless operators exclusively attached with them, round the clock, deputed to continuously inform them on information on crime reported by public and on the sport reports of police officers. Thus they can not claim ignorance.  The records of Police Control Room, District Control Rooms and Police Stations and will reflect that about 80 percent of information relating to commission of cognizable offence given to Police Control Room is either burked or if at all registered, is minimised. A team made to examine the informants will definitely confirm it. The study will also reveal that the statements of victims and witnesses are falsely recorded to erase ingredients of crime and facts are twisted for the purpose of burking/minimising crime. The statement in such cases is invariably recorded by concerned police officers in their own handwriting and are the content makers of it, the complainants unwittingly put their signatures and thus are cheated.  If a case is ultimately registered afterminimising the crime is worked out, the victim is told not to depose the true details of the crime happened as if he opts to speak truly, his deposition will contradict maliciously made record by police, resulting in acquittal of accused.

Public, in majority of cases, eager to get quick relief  visit police stations with information on commission of cognizable offences instead of giving information to Police Control Room by dialling 100. A few also send written complaints to police stations and offices of senior police officers by post and also personally meet senior police officers forredressal of their grievances. The evidence of burking /minimising crime by staff posted at Police Station, senior officers of District and Police Headquarters can't fully demonstrate the defects as there is no track of victims/informants turned away without recording their visits. However, we can still find plenty of evidence with regard to matters recorded in records of police stations and offices of Senior Police Officers for fixing their responsibility and showing their involvement inburking/minimising crime. 

In police stations, the public is greeted with awful behaviour of the Duty Officer who is stationed to register the cases but actually is expected to delude on this issue because of threat of disciplinary action against him. Surprisingly, he is also made a scapegoat and punished for non-registration of case when concerned senior Officers need to save their own skin and show proof that they are abiding by law.  The earlier practice of promptly recording verbatim report of informant in prescribed register of FIR against his signatures has already been discarded. The prevailing practice aimed at burkingcrime is to ask the victim to bring written complaint or pen it down at police stations.  The Duty Officers or Readers of Station House Officers retains the complaint so obtained.  In some cases if pressed, a receipt there of is also given to the complainant with impressions of rubber stamp of concerned police station. However, in majority of cases, the above exercise does not result in registration of cases. The complaints of victims deemed to be without any standing and influence are not diarised, looked into and ultimately lost.  However, some of written complaints of victims because of the nature of crime or vociferous demand of complainant on registration of the case are then diarised,but this too does not generally result in registration of cases. These complaints are marked to officers of sub-ordinate ranks who pretend to make their best efforts to solve the cases. However, in the absence of registration of cases, it is nothing but cheating the victims. The police officers except in exceptional cases keep the complaints pending without registering a case, any time in future.  

The complaints are diarised in general diary register/ separately made registers of ordinary complaints, urgent complaints, VIP Complaints and so on. The scrutiny of complaints diarised will provide sufficient evidence on discarding of law on registration of case on information disclosing cognizable offence. We can also look for evidence in reports of loss or missing of mobile phones, driving licenses, identity cards, other documents, and so on lodged in daily diary register /Non-Cognizable Reports register. The examination of makers of these reports will reveal that all most all reports recorded as mobile missing related to theft, extortion, robbery and so on disclosing commission of cognizable offence. Similarly, 'missing/loss' of other articles also constitute a size able number of cases requiring registration of cases. 

The complicity of Senior Officers can be easily traced and fixed in complaints received directly in their respective offices and recorded visits of victims/informants. These officers do not react on being informed of trauma faced by public on registration of cases.  Instead of acting against the delinquent police officers on not following mandatory provisions of law, they ignore it to facilitate the violation. They know exactly the number of complaints received in their own offices disclosing information as to commission of  a cognizable offence and total cases registered by the concerned police stations on the complaints of public. The voluminous crime data in different formats, briefings, checking of record of police stations on visits, feed back and complaints from general public in their own offices and so on when compared with cases registered clearly show that concerned senior officers are not ignoramuses but responsible for burking/minimising crime. Their own official record proves it.

 We have to realise thatburking/minimising cognizable offences result in destruction of evidence in not taking notice thereof. This necessitates registration of a case and prosecution of delinquent police officers for destruction of evidence. In cases where information of cognizable offence is not taken note of resulting in its the continuity, the police officer comes in the ambit ofabetment/conspiracy of the offence in addition to destruction of evidencerequiring registration of cases in these offences to launch prosecution against them. In the last category we can have two types of cases. In first part come cases not registered resulting in continuity of offence. The second part covers   where “honest police officers” acting in accordance with law are put to illegal action by senior police officers to ensure continuity of offence. The above observations also give a reasonable explanation as to why the crime in Delhi is increasing, in spite of less number of cases reported in police stations

Police have already swung into action to further foster this prevalent “Jungle Raj”where the common man is the prey and the rich and influential and the Police are the predators. It is now totally on the common man to fend for himself and take urgent steps of awakening. We should understand the fact that our constitution and laws are the best in the world, but due to legal illiteracy prevailing among citizens across all quarters, the police are capable of frustrating the ends of justice.  

Schemes and policies of procedural laws recognized as a hand made to justice are based on a well known maxim of common law viz. "UBI JUS IBIREMEDIUM" which means “where there is a right there is a remedy”, so the whole purpose of law fails ,if there is no mechanism to enforce it. Hence, let’s not sit over our rights and blame the system, remember, law supports only those who are smart, vigilant & aware of their rights. Next time on refusal on the part of a police officer to lodge an FIR on an offence relating to a cognizable offence (for definition and types refer above) and those which are given in the schedule 2 of the criminal procedure code, be aware of the other remedies available to you. If an offence is committed on your or someone else’s  property, body  etc, ensure that you call the phone number 100 since every information received there is recorded in the PCR(Police Control Room), and it will form  a part of the record. Then, you can either file a written complaint  to the investigating officer  yourself  stating  the exact account of  sequence of events having taken place, or in case if he records your statement, ensure that he pens down the exact version of your dictation without an iota of manipulation from anybody’s end. 

The Superintendent of Police can be addressed if your complaint is not converted into an FIR, in writing and by post. (procedure in view of section 154(3)). If at all your complaint falls on deaf ears again, simply proceed to the court of the area Metropolitan Magistrate through a private complaint under section  190 (a) or an application under section 156(3) who can the take the cognizance himself to hold an inquiry or direct the police to register the case and investigate the matter. In very rare cases, even if the magistrate refuses to comply with the above proceedings then a writ petition in the High Court (article 226) can be filed or 482(inherent power).

Since this is quite an overview of your legal rights for the common knowledge, I would like to conclude with the following thoughts for you to ponder over -Corruption exists, is taken for granted, even celebrated. India is not truly free because like slaves, we passively accept injustice. Stealing is violence. Lust is violence. Passive acceptance of injustice is violence. Disrespect is violence. Laziness is violence. By that token, we unquestioningly accept violence at home, on our streets, in our workplaces and from those in public office and it are us and only us who can change this and make India a better place to live in. True patriotism lies in not just saluting our national flag or standing up for the national anthem, we need to have a purpose in our lives, if not for anyone else, for ourselves and our future generations. You get back what you give.

I’ll look forward to your feed back (Prashant.Manchanda05@gmail.com) as that would definitely reaffirm my belief that there are still law abiding and proactive citizens around us.

REFORMS TO CURB POLITICISATION OF BUREAUCRACY - A Few Good Reads

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN INDIA: NEED FOR
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROBLEM-SOLVING
Punit Arora
ABSTRACT
In review of Indian administrative structure in 1950s, Appleby certified Indian Civil Service to be one of the best in the world. While there is still a lot to commend the civil service for, this article will focus exclusively on the deficiencies that have crept in the services over last few years. This should not be taken to mean that all is wrong with it. The article does, however, attempt to present the critique of the service from the perspective of an insider with a view to rid it of its malaise. Despite its notable achievements, over last five decades, disenchantment with public administration in India has dramatically increased. It is criticized for inefficiency, lack of professionalism, irresponsiveness, nepotism and corruption. After the assumption of power by UPA government, civil services have come under a real scanner. The government appointed an expert committee, under the chairmanship of the Hota committee, to review and suggest changes to the administrative structure. The committee submitted its report recently. It suggested changes in recruitment and performance appraisal system, opening of civil service position to outsiders and relaxing norms pertaining to removal from service to shake complacency of the civil servants. This article argues that these proposals are too restrictive in nature and scope. They are limited to changes in the upper echelon of bureaucracy. These don’t just exclude a large part of bureaucracy from the reform efforts, but also fail to address the factors external to the administration that hinge upon its performance. To be specific, the article presents evidence of the linkage between the deficiencies in the political, electoral and judicial system and the decline in performance of civil service. It reasons that it is meaningless to talk of administrative reforms without undertaking simultaneous reforms in political and electoral system. Finally, it suggests a more comprehensive reform agenda to improve the performance of civil service, and above all emphasizes the need for adopting the systems approach to problem-solving.

INTRODUCTION
The performance of public administration in India has come under close scrutiny in the last few years. Rampant corruption, inefficiencies, wastages and irresponsiveness to the needs of citizens are some of the commonly acknowledged problems afflicting the administration. While these problems are common to all the levels in government, the spotlight has firmly been on the uppermost echelon of the bureaucracy- the Indian Civil Service (ICS or service). ICS was constituted as Imperial Civil Service in 1886-87 by British colonial rulers and has continued virtually in the same form ever since (Indian Civil Service, 2006). When the Constituent Assembly gathered to draft the constitution for free India, most of its members were in favor of dissolution of ICS. Given the history of freedom movement and the use of State apparatus to curb it, this was not surprising. Most freedom fighters did not understand that the service at whose hands they suffered was performing its duty to implement the law and the law was not made by the members of the services. It was made by a colonial power. However, Sardar Patel who was first Home Minister of India felt that without an apolitical, efficient civil service it was well nigh impossible to govern and keep India together. In a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, he wrote, “I need hardly emphasize that an efficient, disciplined, and contented service, assured of its prospects as a result of diligent and honest work is a sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime even more than under an authoritarian rule.The service must be above party and we should ensure that political considerations,either in its recruitment or in its discipline and control, are reduced to the minimum, if not eliminated altogether." (Nehru, 1999) In the end, he prevailed upon the leadership of Indian National Congress and the Constituent Assembly. And ICS was not just retained but was granted wide-ranging civil service protections under Article 311 of Indian Constitution itself. Once Patel succeeded in convincing the Constituent Assembly about
the necessity of retaining ICS, the assembly went with him all the way and accepted the ICS as it then existed. It felt that the change in the men manning the service by itself would make a difference to the way it responded to the Indian public and its representatives, the politicians (Nehru, 1999). While ICS has basically persisted with this structure without much change till date, its performance appears to be on the decline. Admittedly, corruption and inefficiency are serious issues facing public administration in India. India is ranked lowly 88th in Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, despite being a free democratic country with liberal constitutional structure. The Alagh Committee appointed to study performance of civil services made a special mention of the decline in the levels of integrity among civil servants (Kaur, 2001). Guhan and Paul (1997) believe that corruption in India has gone ballistic over the last decade. While there are no statistics specific to corruption in the ICS, it is believed that “...over half of the officers have joined the politicians in corrupt practices.” (Nehru, 1999) In the first 25 years of free India, ICS was believed to be largely free of corruption, though it was even then often accused of being elitist, remote, and inaccessible to common man. Over next quarter century, while it has become more and more accessible, the corruption has been steadily shooting up. Apart from corruption, the Alagh Committee noted, “A negative orientation, declining professionalism, intellectual sluggishness and a lack of ability to acquire new knowledge, un-dynamic outlook and, at times, a complete lack of intellectual honesty as some of the other weaknesses of the ICS." (Kaur, 2001) The decay and decline of “steel frame” has increasingly become a matter of concern. In early 1950s when Paul Appleby visited India to suggest changes to its administrative machinery, he certified Indian Civil Service to be one of the best in the world. ‘This scenario began to change after the death of Nehru and other statesmen in mid-1960s. The period 1977-80 witnessed the accentuation of some of the malpractices and distortions of the political system. Some of these malpractices began to degenerate into criminal practices and led to criminalization of the political system in many areas.” (Gadkari, 1996)

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
To address the issue, in the past also, a large number of commissions and expert committees have been set up to review the functioning of ICS and administration. These expert groups have basically limited their recommendations to making minor adjustments to the structure. They have implicitly assumed that the present system to be the best possible system, which with minor corrections and modifications can be rid of all its evils and shortcomings. Hahn Been Lee, who studied reform efforts in developing countries including India believes, “Administrative reforms have mainly been associated with staff services such as personnel, budgeting, and organization method. Administrative techniques and procedures were the main objects. Few reform projects were conceived in terms of substantive programs or institutions.” (Singh, 2005: 24) After the assumption of power by Congress-led United People’s Alliance (UPA) at the center, reform efforts have gained momentum, partly because UPA government contested with an agenda of governance reforms, but mainly because the current prime minister is believed to be an honest reformer. While the efforts to reform governance have increased and become more concerted, it is surprising that the agenda has not altered in its breadth or scope. The reforms that are being suggested include, among others, changes in the recruitment and performance appraisal system, opening up of senior positions to “outsiders”, increase in emoluments, declaration of assets, attachment of ill-gotten property of officials and summary dismissal of corrupt civil servants by amending Article 311 of the Constitution. As is easily discernible, these changes are still very much within the confines of what may be termed as “Hahn Been Lee Limits” -- reform agenda limited to changes in staffing.
These proposals do not address the core issues and challenges facing the administrative services in India. Before going into further details, let us consider what these proposals purport to achieve and how far they are likely to succeed. The changes in recruitment system envisage reduction in age at the time of recruitment. This recommendation has found special favor with training institutions since they feel that increase in average age at recruitment has limited their effectiveness in “shaping the trainees” to their liking. The government initially toyed with a radical idea of recruiting officers at very young age and increasing the length of training to about five years. This position was echoed by Cabinet Secretary Chaturvedi, who is the highest ranking bureaucrat in the country, said: "At the age of 17-18, their value system can be molded. Molding value system when a person is 30 and married with a family is a tall order.” (Chand, 2006) This recommendation was slightly modified by the Hota Committee that was appointed by UPA government to review and suggest changes to the administrative system. It recommended the reduction in the maximum age at recruitment from 30 years to 24 years with no change in the present system of training for two years. The changes in performance appraisal system envisage moving from confidential to open appraisal system, and outlining the career path of an officer at the time of annual appraisal. In the confidential appraisal system, no officer is theoretically expected to be told how his he performed and how he was graded. Therefore, there is no scope for feedback unless you get an adverse remark in your appraisal. However, if an adverse entry is made, the officer concerned has a right to appeal against it. This involves quasijudicial and judicial process, which is entirely too much of an effort in justifying your
evaluation. As a result, in practice, it is very rare that anyone is given an adverse remark. Over a period of time, this appraisal system has virtually become meaningless. It is expected that making performance appraisal system more “private-sector” like would help improve the performance of public servants.
Opening up some civil service positions to non-career civil servants is expected to provide competition to career officers and shake them out of complacency. “The main problem the civil service faces today is that it is no longer getting the right talent either at the junior level or at the top. There are a very few good officers left in the service.

The first solution, therefore, is to create competition by increasing the supply of good officers in the system” (Bhattacharya, 2005) It is suggested that this objective can be achieved by inducting top private sector managers in the civil service positions, if necessary by giving competitive compensation packages. For existing civil servants, the Fifth Pay Commission recommended about 20% increase in the emoluments and benefits, and of course this recommendation was promptly accepted. This increase in emoluments is supposed to provide some sort of parity between private and public sector salaries and lessen the incentives for corruption. Simultaneously, making provisions on declaration of assets and attachment of ill-gotten property more stringent is expected to act as disincentive to corruption.
It is also true that civil service protection and widely prevalent belief in life-long job security encourages non-performance. Therefore, it makes apparent sense to relax rules pertaining to removal from service on grounds of inefficiency, corruption and nonperformance. Therefore, it is suggested that Article 311 of the constitution be amended to provide for summary dismissal of civil servants if they exhibit doubtful integrity or lack of competence.

WILL THE REFORM AGENDA SUCCEED?
How radical is this reform agenda and how likely is it to succeed? Let’s briefly consider different reform proposals severally at first before anticipating their impact in totality. Reduction in age at recruitment essentially is a policy recommendation that advocates reverting back to the age limits prevalent in 1970s. For this recommendation to be meaningful, a number of factors need to be established. First, it has to be shown that the training institutions have higher success rate in molding officers recruited at younger age than their older colleagues. Secondly, it has to be established that the younger officers show better inclination to stay honest. Third, younger officers show better understanding of job requirements and deliver better results. Since there have been no empirical studies to substantiate or contradict the recommendation, we will have to limit our analysis to the organizational folklore and such other evidence as is available. If this recommendation is true, we should expect a difference in the performance of officers recruited together, commonly known as batch of officers, but at significant age difference. One would also expect all batches prior to mid-1970s to perform better than the recent batches. From my knowledge and experience in ICS, unfortunately neither of the facts stands up to the scrutiny of the facts. In fact, the organizational folklore considers the length of service, and not the age, as the determinant of the decline in efficiency and integrity.

It is commonly joked around that every year a civil servant loses one column from his vertebra and therefore by the time he reaches final lap in service, he has no backbone left and bends towards any side the pressure forces him to. “Even comparatively straight and honest officers when reaching the end of their career have been known to have completely lost their spine in the hope of securing sinecure post-retirement jobs." (Mathur, 2004) This view holds that all officers are more or less equally likely to show commitment to values, however over a period of time, officers learn to compromise and adjust. Of course, there are significant differences in the meaning and the extent of what constitutes a compromise to different officers.
Secondly, it is in a sense in contradiction to the recommendation on professionalizing the services. Most recruits entering services at older age are the ones who have graduate degrees with practical experiences in management, engineering, accounting, community services or other professions. These recruits bring their experience in private organizations to the civil service, which has an effect that is similar to opening of the profession to outsiders. Because apart from bringing their knowledge, skill, and professional ethics; they also tend to have peers in private sector to compete with at a
personal level.
Thirdly, wittingly or unwittingly, this recommendation is a negation of gains made by lobby for affirmative action. The age limits have been raised in response to demands of the experts who felt that it helped poorer and weaker sections to gain entry into the system, for unlike students from richer background who could devote their energies exclusively to study and prepare for rigorous competition, these people needed to support themselves and their education. If this is true, rolling back the age limits would help the more affluent or privileged sections within different communities. This recommendation, therefore, has the potential to be construed as an attempt by the elite
to fight back.
There is a mixed reaction to changes in the appraisal system. Some experts are cautiously positive; others believe it to be a minor change. Bhattacharya (2005) states considers “...while a transition from a closed and secret system of evaluation to one where the officers have the right to know how they are being rated is a positive change, it is naïve to believe that the IAS system will permit a group of senior officers to make a bold and candid assessment of their colleagues.” (Bhattacharya, 2005) The moot point in this respect, however, is that even when the appraisal was confidential, superior
officers found it extremely difficult to make bold judgments about their junior colleagues. Even where they knew an officer to be corrupt or incompetent, they gave him a good appraisal most likely out of concerns for political viability or organizational culture. If the evaluation is open, in my opinion as an insider, it is extremely likely that superior officers will feel more pressured to give a good appraisal report to avoid political fall-out. The open appraisal is more likely to succeed if the politicization of services is avoided to a substantial degree.

CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED
Throwing open civil service position to outsiders is a good recommendation if three conditions are satisfied. First, there are no officers within the service who can do the job equally good. Second, this option would not be utilized as a mean of patronage and nepotism. Third, the people thus hired will be given the autonomy necessary to deliver goods. As it happens, in most of the cases, none of these conditions are met to any satisfactory result. If competence is the criteria, ICS fortunately is not devoid of talent. In fact, of late, tendency to ignore the competent officers has been on the rise. Second, in a country just emerging from princely rules and that has long history of nepotism, including class and caste considerations, it is not clear that the political class, without considerable changes to their accountability mechanism as shown later in the article, can be trusted to hire people on the basis of their ability to perform the job better. Finally, even when people have been hired directly from outside of civil service, they have not been given adequate power, autonomy and responsibility to make any impact. In fact, there has hardly been any effort to make change the institutional structures. Under the circumstances, merely co-opting private sector managers is not going to be of much help. It is also possible that it might exacerbate the problem since higher competition in the present scenario translates into higher pressure for pliability, which has, of late, been noted as a serious concern with ICS. Chandra (2006: 28), for example, notes that, “...the present-day civil servants have become subservient to politicians…..
They are highly politicized and even divided along party lines and do not seem to mind politicians walking all over them so long as the important postings are secured….. Merit is no longer the criteria for a posting but factors like money, caste, proximity with political bigwigs are.” If it is true, is it advisable to restrict the choice available to politicians to civil servants or expand it?
Provision for disclosure of assets is not a new feature at all. All public servants,including politicians, are expected to file their annual property returns -- a provision that is breached more often than observed, and such flagrant violation is overlooked without any qualms. Finally, let’s discuss the proposal to relax the rules governing disciplinary action and removal from the service. It is true that the present rules and norms place significant restriction against arbitrary dismissal and provide significant protection to civil servants. However, there is no case where the government wanted to remove someone but could not because of such protections. Conversely, a large number of cases
can be cited where officers were found guilty and recommended for removal despite such lengthy, involved and cumbersome procedure, but no action was or has been taken against them. It suggests that need to search for factors other than the rules and procedure that might be the root-cause. In fact, for reasons that are elaborated later in this article, I would argue that relaxing these rules will increase the pressure on civil servants to be even more pliable, which is contrary to the aims that reformers purport to pursue.
Outlining the agenda and need for reforms, Cabinet Secretary Chaturvedi stated that “he wanted non-performers to go out and upright officers to get more protection." (Chand,2006: 29) While I agree with his assertion of the need for weeding out deadwood in officialdom, I don’t see how present agenda can help meet this object. In their present form, these measures constitute no more than half-hearted tinkering at the edges at best, and harmful declension at worst. Even when taken together, they don’t amount to much.
They are nowhere near as radical as they are made out to be. “These are all marginal changes that seek to correct anomalies in the system that could have been eliminated long ago.” (Bhattacharya, 2005; 56) What is even more noteworthy is the fact that the proposals do not cover more than 99% of total public administrative staff, which is much more notorious for corruption, inefficiency, irresponsiveness, and pliability (Debroy, 2004). In fact, as a result of politicization of this lower level functionaries, including state civil services, ICS finds that it doesn’t have adequate control over the organizations anymore. The proposals cover neither how they propose to address the similar problems at a much higher magnitude with non-ICS employees in the public administration, nor how they seek to address this control issue.
Further, much of what is being advocated now is not new either. “All these are changes that have been recommended by some government committee or the other in the last 30 years." (Bhattacharya, 2005: 151) An editorial in The Hindu riled the government after Hota Committee submitted its report. “One wonders what the government does with such reports. There was one some years ago by Surendra Nath committee. No one knows what happened to it, or to other reports submitted by other distinguished bodies such as the 5th Pay Commission." (Ghose, 2006) Most commentators blame the bureaucracy for not preventing these recommendations from getting accepted and implemented. Ghose (2006: 38), for example, states that, “It is as if these reports are simply swallowed up by the bureaucratic machine, and life goes on as usual.”

BUREAUCRATIC RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE
These commentators ascribe two reasons for bureaucratic reluctance to change. First is bureaucratic inertia and lethargy. “One can understand the reluctance of the bureaucracy to accept recommendations that would curb its present manner of functioning, and alter the rather comfortable manner in which civil servants go about their day-to-day work." (Ghose, 2006; 38) The second is their resentment at being perceived as dishonest or incompetent. “One can also appreciate that such reports generate a certain amount of indignation because, contrary to the picture that is sometimes painted of the services, all officers are not a set of dishonest, incompetent people; on the other hand, for the most part, they are people who do their work as best they can, are not dishonest, are fairly efficient, with some being a little more so than others." (Ghose, 2006: 28) A survey of literature suggests that there has been very little attempt to search for alternative reasons for non-implementation of these measures and this seems to be the generally-accepted position. This is despite the fact that the politicization of bureaucracy is commonly acknowledged to be the major source for decline in the performance of civil service. While there is some truth in the allegation, it is not the complete truth. It is flattering, indeed, to believe that the services still retain adequate power to stall the changes that have been accepted by the popularly elected leaders against their wishes.

PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
This article takes a contrarian view and suggests that the policy-makers are not really interested in the real reforms. In other words, what is suggested here is that in the Indian context, the problem is not that the agent (bureaucracy) is not responsive to the agenda set by the principal (elected representatives), but that the honest and good performance by the agent is in fact against the interest of the principal. This essentially means that“civil services suffer more from problems external to them, especially those related to the environment in which they function. To put it bluntly, it is the excessive politicization of the civil services that hampers their performance, more than anything else. (Mathur, 2004) In stating this I don’t mean to exonerate the services of their share of culpability. I merely intend to depict a vicious cycle in which public administration in India is caught up for the purpose of advocating a holistic, systemic approach for satisfactory resolution of the problem. The first component of this cycle is the nature of electoral politics in modern democracies. As noted by Harold Lasswell, “The competition for occupying or controlling the power apparatus of society has become quiet intense. It often assumes a form in which no holds are barred." (Bhagat, 1996: 9) This development is accompanied by the rise of career politicians. Politics is no longer the preserve of wealthy statesmen whose only interest in politics is to perform public service. Today, politician is an
individual who makes his living by winning the elections (Tullock, 1999: 18). Now, since politics is viewed as an investment that though promises rich dividends but also carries high risk due to intense competition, candidates are not unexpectedly willing to spend incredible amount of money to win the elections.The expensive electoral process, especially in the developing countries, makes it almost impossible for an honest politician to get elected. In India, election expenses have been spiraling up in recent years. Today, it is very common to spend a million dollars on an election to the Parliament of this poor country. To provide an appropriate context for this number, if elected, a Member of Parliament can officially expect to receive only about 500 dollars a month in salary in return for this investment. Similarly, elections to State Assemblies and local governments are prohibitively expensive. Further, frequent elections and insecurity often necessitates politicians to aim for early recovery of their “investments”.
This problem has been noted by expert committee after expert committee set up to study election process. For example, the Tarakunde committee stated that, “A major malady in the operation of elections in India has been the reckless use of money. We recognize that many of the obligations imposed on candidates in most keenly contested elections cannot be fulfilled successfully without substantial expenditure...The steep rise in election expenses is the result of a deliberate preference in favor of money power as a major instrument of winning election…the unrestricted use of big money inevitably leads to the corruption and distortion of political processes." (Bhagat, 1996: 199) This problem was recognized as early as 1971. The Election Commission in its report to the Government of India mentioned that, “The parties and candidates would do well to remember that apart from all moral considerations, even considerations of pure selfinterest suggest that corrupt practices in the elections should be eliminated. Corrupt practice incites corrupt practices, and starts a vicious competition among political parties.” (Bhagat, 1996: 259) However, over the succeeding decades, role and influence of money in elections has, instead of going down, gone up manifold. Of late, there have been some attempts to impose limits on expenditure without much success. “In reality, average expenditure in most states is several multiples of ceilings determined by law." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157) It is easy to circumvent the ceilings by finding and using the loopholes in laws, for example getting the funds donated to the party and then making the party to spend money on the election of the candidate. This loophole was noticed by the Indian Supreme Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta versus
Amarnath Chawla. The court observed that “If a candidate were to be subject to the limitation of the ceiling, but the political party sponsoring him, or his friends and supporters were to be free to spend as much as they like in connection with his election, the object of imposing the ceiling is completely frustrated and the beneficent provision enacted in the interest of purity and genuineness of the democratic process would be wholly frustrated." (Bhagat, 1996: 201) After the court asked the government and the election commission to plug this loophole, a separate ceiling for party’s contribution towards a candidate’s campaign was imposed. However, there are still several shortcomings and ambiguities in the laws that permit mind boggling expenditure. And it is a continuous tussle between “creative” minds determined to find the loopholes and the enforcement to plug those. What complicates the task of enforcing the ceilings is that a large portion of expenditure is made by using black money for unaccounted and unaccountable purposes like direct distribution of cash to the targeted electorate or small-time political operators.

CONCLUSIONS
If the politicians and political parties willingly spend such huge amounts on elections, it is because they expect to collect exorbitant returns on their investments. This “rent seeking behavior is therefore endemic to the system. Most of this corruption is in the form of control of transfers and postings, which in turn sustains a system of retail corruption for a variety of routine services, regulatory functions and direct transfer of resources through government programs." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157) What this essentially means is that the political ‘entrepreneur’ creates his own supply-chain for managing his business. Under his business model, civil servants become distributors wholesaler or retailer depending on their position, and they distribute patronage and contracts and collect rent by way of bribes, cuts and kickbacks. This worldview is largely favorable to the civil servants. It visualizes civil servants as helpless victims at the hands of their political masters who prevent civil servants from performing their duties effectively. “Others, and an increasingly large number, view politicians and civil servants as the two sides of the same coin, both having joined hands in usurping the system for their personal gain." (Mathur, 2004) Whether a civil servant is viewed as a victim or a willing accomplice in this game of personal aggrandizement at the expense of people, the end result is same. Therefore, we would not be wrong in concluding that administrative reforms are intimately intertwined with political reforms. In the absence of electoral reforms that make it possible for honest and competent politicians to get elected, administrative reforms will not just bear any fruit, but also will make honest civil servants more vulnerable to pressure from politicians to align their interests with the goal of politicians. Therefore, any reforms of administration must be co-terminus with electoral reforms. The last interaction is between the society and the governance system in general with regard to .the learning behavior of people. “As the vicious cycle of money power, polling irregularities and corruption take hold of the system, electoral verdicts cease to make a difference to people." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157) This leads to general disenchantment among people with respect to system of governance. Since irrespective of who is in the power they continue to be victimized, citizens start maximizing their short-term returns by habitually trading votes for money and liquor. Once the voters start trading the votes, political class finds itself confronted with a Frankenstein’s
monster that was largely its own creation.
This completes the vicious cycle afflicting public administration in India. All the factors in the vicious cycle are dynamically linked together, and a change in one factor is likely to impact all other factors. To succeed in pushing through a change in this situation, broadly two kinds of strategies are available. If the intervention has to be only in one sub-system, then it has to be large enough for its impact to be felt in all sub-systems. For example, if the corruption can be made significantly riskier or much less lucrative, it is theoretically possible to make the prospect of governmental power and position less alluring for the dishonest politicians if we assume that we can make the civil service completely free of corruption which means that no civil servant would entertain illicit demands from politicians. Similarly, the converse is also true. Ridding the political class of corruption by itself can rectify the system. In practice, such major changes in one sub-system without corresponding changes in other sub-systems are rare. If it is possible to make changes in several or all sub-systems, even relatively smaller changes can also succeed. There are a number of policy alternatives that satisfy the criteria outlined above. What is important to remember is that the intervention should either be large or broad enough. It is with this possibility in mind that recommendations are made in the succeeding paragraphs.
As far as civil service is considered, we immediately need to constitute a Civil Service Board, fix minimum tenures, introduce result-based management and take the transfers out of the control of political class. “The ability of the political executive to transfer officers arbitrarily has increased the play of politics in the administration. It enables the executive to punish disobedient officials." (Debroy, 2004: 106) The fifth pay commission noted the gravity of this problem and suggested detailed guidelines as a part of comprehensive transfer policy; including the constitution of a civil service board.” (Debroy, 2004: 106) Recently, “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh...exhorted the states not to transfer officers frequently. Such exhortations have been made in the past too and even courts have taken cognizance of this phenomenon, but things have not improved; if anything, the situation has deteriorated over the years." (Mathur, 2004) The government needs to move beyond mere exhortations and evolve a consensus, define the role of the civil services in the scheme of governance, provide reasonable autonomy to the civil service and then hold it accountable for the results.I would not recommend any one-best way of achieving this objective. I would rather recommend deciding the objectives in each case on the basis of the circumstances confronting it. However, I do advocate considering the Agencification model as far as practicable. This would necessitate assigning each agency, well-defined goals and its chief executives, adequate powers and responsibility to make changes, including to the compensation structure, as may be needed to make the agency work. This would also restore the control of chief executive on his agency and limit the political interference to the minimum necessary level.
This would also take care of the problems identified by the Economic Administrative Reform Commission. On review of some agencies engaged in development work, it stated that, “The targets for each organization were not well-defined. Limits to authority were emphasized through audit and other administrative procedures. Accountability was stressed through procedural norms rather than on the basis of task performance." (EARC, 1983: 3-4) This, though, runs the risk of increase in bureaucratic control, irresponsiveness and excesses. To avoid this, the quasi-contracts between the ministers and agency heads would need to be lucidly drawn and enforced rigorously. This change would need to be accompanied with the changes in the judicial and the political structures. Agencification, in particular, requires judiciary to increase its efficiency in disposal of cases brought before it. All the effort at reform would amount to nothing without making changes in the political system for making it possible for honest people to enter the politics and holding them accountable for their actions. This approach again emphasizes systems approach, which alone I believe has chance of succeeding in achieving the desired goals.
When A H Hanson, an expert on planned economy, visited India in 1970s he remarked that, “The men are able, the organization adequate, the procedures intelligently designed. Why have the plans since 1956 so persistently run into crises?" (Debroy,2004: 129) Perhaps, the answer to his riddle lies in the fact that the administration in India has not embraced systems thinking. And not just that it has shied away from the systems thinking, it has also been steadfast in taking the oft-beaten path. If the Indian Civil Service is to claim back its fast losing glory, it needs to avoid the fate that legendary Sisyphus met. Every time it appeared that he had rolled the huge stone to the top of the hill, it rolled back down again. Like Sisyphus, proponents and adversaries of the present civil service alike should not remain locked in a tussle to push the same agenda down each other’s throats. They need to search for creative institutional solutions that best meet the needs of the public service.

Punit Arora, a senior Indian Civil Service Officer, is currently on sabbatical at Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. He has worked for private sector, consulting and developmental organizations including United Nations:
punitsarora@gmail.com
Courtesy:journals.sfu.ca/ipmr/index.php/ipmr/article/download/16/16

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Other good reads:

1.http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-006_161d8937-9cd3-4709-b3ba-53cdc9588cfc.pdf

2.http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_617.pdf

E WAY BILL

Pavan sir lecture will be upload on this youtube channel free of cost from 1 june 2021 subscribe this channel for update..

https://youtube.com/channel/UCIz5yZnP2HAeNxaLcVqkVqg

. What is an eWay Bill?

EWay Bill is an electronic way bill for movement of goods which can be generated on the eWay Bill Portal. Transport of goods of more than Rs. 50,000 (Single Invoice/bill/delivery challan) in value in a vehicle cannot be made by a registered person without an eway bill.

Alternatively, Eway bill can also be generated or cancelled through SMS, Android App and by Site-to-Site Integration(through API).

When an eway bill is generated a unique eway bill number (EBN) is allocated and is available to the supplier, recipient, and the transporter.

2.When Should eWay Bill be issued?

eWay bill will be generated when there is a movement of goods in a vehicle/ conveyance of value more than Rs. 50,000( either each Invoice or in (aggregate of all Invoices in a vehicle/ Conveyance)# )  –

• In relation to a ‘supply’
• For reasons other than a ‘supply’ ( say a return)
• Due to inward ‘supply’ from an unregistered person

For this purpose, a supply may be either of the following:

• A supply made for a consideration (payment) in the course of business
• A supply made for a consideration (payment) which may not be in the course of business
• A supply without consideration (without payment)In simpler terms,  the term ‘supply’ usually means a:

1. Sale – sale of goods and payment made
2. Transfer – branch transfers for instance
3. Barter/Exchange – where the payment is by goods instead of in money

Therefore, eWay Bills must be generated on the common portal for all these types of movements.

For certain specified Goods, the eway bill needs to be generated mandatorily even if the Value of the consignment of Goods is less than Rs. 50,000:

1. Inter-State movement of Goods by the Principal to the Job-worker by Principal/ registered Job-worker***,
2. Inter-State Transport of Handicraft goods by a dealer exempted from GST registration

3.  Who should Generate an eWay Bill?

   • Registered Person – Eway bill must be generated when there is a movement of goods of more than Rs 50,000 in value to or from a Registered Person. A Registered person or the transporter may choose to generate and carry eway bill even if the value of goods is less than Rs 50,000.
   • Unregistered Persons – Unregistered persons are also required to generate e-Way Bill. However, where a supply is made by an unregistered person to a registered person, the receiver will have to ensure all the compliances are met as if they were the supplier. 
   • Transporter – Transporters carrying goods by road, air, rail, etc. also need to generate e-Way Bill if the supplier has not generated an e-Way Bill.

   Latest update as on 23rd Mar 2018:

   Until a date yet to be notified, the transporters need not generate the Eway bill (as Form EWB-01 or EWB-02) where all the consignments in the conveyance :

   • Individually(single Document**) is less than or equal to Rs 50,000 BUT
   • In Aggregate (all documents** put together) exceeds Rs 50,000

   **Document means Tax Invoice/Delivery challan/Bill of supply
   Unregistered Transporters will be issued Transporter ID on enrolling on the e-way bill portal after which Eway bills can be generated.

   Who	When	Part	Form
   Every Registered person under GST	Before movement of goods	Fill Part A	Form GST EWB-01
   Registered person is consignor or consignee (mode of transport may be owned or hired) OR is recipient of goods	Before movement of goods	Fill Part B	Form GST EWB-01
   Registered person is consignor or consignee  and goods are handed over to transporter of goods	Before movement of goods	Fill Part B	The registered person shall furnish the information relating to the transporter in Part B of FORM GST EWB-01
   Transporter of goods	Before movement of goods		Generate e-way bill on basis of information shared by the registered person in Part A of FORM GST EWB-01
   An unregistered person under GST and recipient is registered	Compliance to be done by Recipient as if he is the Supplier.		1. If the goods are transported for a distance of fifty kilometers or less, within the same State/Union territory from the place of business of the consignor to the place of business of the transporter for further transportation, the supplier or the transporter may not furnish the details of conveyance in Part B of FORM GST EWB-01. 2. If supply is made by air, ship or railways, then the information in Part A of FORM GST EWB-01 has to be filled in by the consignor or the recipient

   
   Note: If a transporter is transporting multiple consignments in a single conveyance, they can use the form GST EWB-02 to produce a consolidated e-way bill, by providing the e-way bill numbers of each consignment.
   If both the consignor and the consignee have not created an e-way bill, then the transporter can do so * by filling out PART A of FORM GST EWB-01 on the basis of the invoice/bill of supply/delivery challan given to them.

   4. Cases when eWay bill is Not Required

   In the following cases it is not necessary to generate e-Way Bil:
   1. The mode of transport is non-motor vehicle
   2. Goods transported from Customs port, airport, air cargo complex or land customs station to Inland Container Depot (ICD) or Container Freight Station (CFS) for clearance by Customs.
   3. Goods transported under Customs supervision or under customs seal
   4. Goods transported under Customs Bond from ICD to Customs port or from one custom station to another.
   5. Transit cargo transported to or from Nepal or Bhutan
   6. Movement of goods caused by defence formation under Ministry of defence as a consignor or consignee
   7. Empty Cargo containers are being transported
   8. Consignor transporting goods to or from between place of business and a weighbridge for weighment at a distance of 20 kms, accompanied by a Delivery challan.
   9. Goods being transported by rail where the Consignor of goods is the Central Government, State Governments or a local authority.
   10. Goods specifed as exempt from E-Way bill requirements in the respective State/Union territory GST Rules.
   11. Transport of certain specified goods- Includes the list of exempt supply of goods, Annexure to Rule 138(14), goods treated as no supply as per Schedule III, Certain schedule to Central tax Rate notifications.  (PDF of List of Goods).
   Note: Part B of e-Way Bill is not required to be filled where the distance between the consigner or consignee and the transporter is less than 50 Kms and transport is within the same state.

    5. Status of Implementation across India

   Inter-State movement of goods has seen rise in numbers of generation of eway bills ever since its implementation began from 1st April 2018.
   State-wise implementation of e-way bill system has seen a good response with all the States and Union Territories joining the league in the generation of eway bills for movement of goods within the State/UT.
   However, reliefs have been provided to people of few States by way of exempting them from eway bill generation in case of monetary limits falling below threshold amount or certain specified items. For Instance, Tamil Nadu has exempted people of its State from the generation of eway bill if the monetary limit of the items falls below Rs. One Lakh. To know more of such reliefs for other States/UTs, visit commercial tax websites for each of such States/UTs.

   6. How to generate eWay Bill

   E-Way Bill can be generated on the e-Way Bill Portal. All you need is a Portal login.